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NOTABLE STUDENT WORK
Computer Viruses and the Law
I. Introduction
On November 3, 1988, a computer virus spread across the na-
tion in what experts called the largest virus outbreak thus far in the
nation.' The virus spread rapidly throughout a nationwide network
of computers which included Arapnet, a Department of Defense
computer network. This well-publicized event illustrated the vulnera-
bility of a sophisticated government computer system and raised new
and far-reaching legal questions regarding the security of all com-
puter systems and networks.
The network that fell victim to this virus is known as Internet, a
computerized information system used by universities, military con-
tractors, research centers, and the Pentagon. Internet links approxi-
mately 50,000 computer terminals across an intricate electronic net-
work. During the day-long epidemic, the virus spread throughout the
network to wherever local computers and systems were linked. The
systems that were connected to the network soon filled up with extra-
neous computer information, which caused the computers to perform
extra calculations and in some instances to overload and shut down.'
The ill-fated virus program that wreaked this havoc was alleg-
edly developed by a computer science graduate student. The pro-
gram was part of a personal experiment that he began after discov-
ering a flaw in security that allowed him to access the restricted
Arapnet network.3 The student's original intent was purportedly to
spread a "harmless" virus program secretly through the nationwide
system. The program was to spread slowly from computer to com-
puter throughout the network leaving behind one copy of the illicit
program on each machine. The student planned to eventually inform
1. New York Times, Nov. 4, 1988, at Al, col. 3.
2. Id.
3. New York Times, Nov. 6, 1988, at 30, col. 2.
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users of the intrusion of the virus as a way of pointing out the weak-
nesses in the system. Due to a single incorrect number written within
the computer code of the virus, however, the program copied itself
hundreds of times into each machine it contacted.4
Although it appears that no data was lost, the research and sci-
entific community temporarily lost the use of the communications
network, in addition to tens of thousands of individual computers.
Many staff hours were spent checking, purging and restoring opera-
tions of the computers on the network.5 Because of the difficulty in
assessing the full and possibly hidden impact of the virus and deter-
mining how many individual programs were affected, the amount
and extent of physical and financial damages cannot yet be esti-
mated.6 Some computer experts estimate that clearing the machines
of the virus will cost millions of dollars in labor.7 But as one com-
puter expert stated, "The big issue is that a relatively benign
software program can virtually bring our computing community to
its knees and keep it there for some time."'
Incidents similar to the November 1988 virus have occurred
before over the past few years, but none have been of this magnitude
or have generated this much publicity. Perhaps the greater publicity
associated with this latest incident will awaken the public to the po-
tential for substantial disruption and possible destruction of com-
puter networks essential to defense, public safety, and business.
Many viruses detected prior to this outbreak have been relatively mi-
nor. The magnitude and speed of this recent virus have highlighted
the fragility of existing computer security systems and have raised
many questions regarding the ultimate effects such an invasion may
produce in the future.'
The computer community is split over the gravity of the offense.
Even though the damage done by this virus may have been acciden-
tal, computer managers were angered by the need to spend days rid-
ding their computers of the program. On the other hand, some com-
puter experts feel that the program may have performed a public
service by finally causing the computer community to give increased
attention to computer security.1" Not only have these recent events
4. New York Times, Nov. 6, 1988, at 30, col. 3.
5. id.
6. The Washington Post, Nov. 4, 1988, at A4, col. 1.
7. The Washington Post, Nov. 6, 1988, at A9, col. 1.
8. The New York Times, Nov. 4, 1988, at AI, col. 4 (quoting Chuck Cole, deputy com-
puter security manager at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in Livermore, Cal.).
9. The Harrisburg Patriot-News, Nov. 6, 1988, at 6, col. 3.
10. New York Times, Nov. 6, 1988 at 30, col. 4.
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raised technical questions about how computer viruses occur and
how they can be stopped, but the events also have raised new and
interesting questions regarding legal safeguards and deterrents that
exist to help ward off or respond to similar events.
II. What are Computer Viruses?
Computer viruses are computer instructions or small hidden
programs that are inserted into a standard computer program or into
a computer's operating system. These instructions may replicate
many times during a single program execution, infect every program
on a computer disk and be passed on secretly to other computers
through modems, floppy discs, or network connections. 1
A programmer creates a virus by writing a computer code
which can attach itself to other programs. Once attached, this code
may alter the operations of a program or destroy data kept on a
computer disk. A virus can "infect" a computer system as a result of
programming or by users running an already infected computer pro-
gram on the system. Unsuspecting users running virus-infected pro-
grams allow the virus to establish itself in a computer system. Once
established, the virus can access and modify any file the user is au-
thorized to access." Similar to a biological virus, a computer virus
spreads rapidly from a single point of infection. Multiplying in geo-
metrical progression as it works its way through a computer system
or network, the computer virus may contaminate all files within a
computer system.' s
A computer virus basically carries a genetic code in machine
language. The virus may be benign or malicious. A malicious virus
can cripple a network with dead-end tasks, erase files, create false
information, and in some cases, destroy equipment."
The virus can spread to other computers through exchange of
computer programs, through computer networks, or through elec-
tronic bulletin boards. Users of the recipient computer rarely know
of the infection because viruses are generally designed to remain dor-
mant for some predetermined time. Using the internal clock calen-
dar of its host, the virus can then activate itself at an appointed time
or following a specific event, and then perform its designated
I1. LEGISLATIVE BUDGET & FINANCE COMMITTEE, REPORT TO THE PA GENERAL As-
SEMBLY OF 1988, at 8 (1988) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE PA GENERAL ASSEMBLY].
12. Id. at 12.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 133.
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function."8
The viruses that have been reported seem to encompass what
were previously known as logic bombs, Trojan Horses, and worms. A
logic bomb is a computer program hidden within another problem,
and when triggered, is usually highly destructive. If the program is
set to go off on a certain date, it also includes a "time bomb."'" A
''worm" is a set of instructions that infiltrate and interfere with the
computer's ordinary instructions. 7 Sometimes, a program will be
given to a user as something useful or enjoyable, but the program
contains malicious instructions. Such programs are known as "Tro-
jan Horses."' 8
Computer manufacturers increasingly promote connectivity or
networking to computer users. In order for computers to share infor-
mation, data generated from one computer must be available to an-
other program on a different computer by modem or direct connec-
tion. 19 This gives users the ability to link computers within offices,
buildings and across the country."0 The Apple Computer Company
even dubbed 1988 the "Year of Connectivity."21
With the increased emphasis on networking and connecting per-
sonal computers with mainframes, the ability of computer viruses to
spread quickly among- users has grown. Often personal computers
are shared by many people in one location, making it very difficult to
contain a spreading virus or identify its source.2
Prior to the November 3, 1988 outbreak, the largest group af-
fected by viruses appeared to be home users, small businesses and
people who use public bulletin boards.23 The incidence of reported
computer viruses, however, has increased. Over the last two years,
viruses have been found on college campuses, home computers, in-
dustry networks and even at NASA.2'
The first computer viruses were created for legitimate purposes.
In the 1970s computer security firms created and used virus pro-
grams to trace the evolution of programs being copied illegally.
15. Hafner, Is Your Computer Secure?, BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 1, 1988, at 70.
16. REPORT TO THE PA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, supra note 11, at 44.
17. Gemignani, What is Computer Crime, and Why Should We Care?, 10 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L.J. 55, 64 n.39 (1987-88).
18. REPORT TO THE PA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, supra note 1I, at 12.
19. Id. at 12-13.
20. Thornburg, Computer Viruses Use Networks to Spread the Disease of Distrust,
COMPUTE, July 1988, at 10.
21. Bartman, MS-DOS/MAC Connectivity, MAC USER, Sept. 1988, at 106.
22. Id. at 106.
23. Thornburg, supra note 20, at 10.
24. REPORT TO THE PA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, supra note I1, at 10-11.
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These viruses were supposed to decrease the "pirating," or illegal
copying, of computer software among users.25 Today, computer vi-
ruses are an example of a new form of computer vandalism that can
have serious implications for persons and businesses who depend
upon computers.26 Businesses rely on computers to run industrial
plants, to control production schedules, to process accounts payable
and receivable transactions, and to design products. Service indus-
tries such as banks and airlines depend on their computers to carry
out essential and often very intricate transactions. Financial institu-
tions transmit close to $1 trillion daily using computer networks.
27
Some state governments rely on computers to distribute unemploy-
ment compensation and welfare payments, to register motor vehicles
and drivers license records, and to record court and criminal
records.2" The proposed Strategic Defense Initiative depends abso-
lutely on computer software.29
III. Controlling Computer Viruses
State and federal lawmakers currently face the question of how
to punish perpetrators of computer viruses. They must decide
whether a computer virus is a computer-related act that is so dan-
gerous to the public welfare that society should punish those who
commit such acts through the criminal justice system.30 The answer
to this complex issue requires a balancing of the seemingly harmless
effects of a benign virus against the consequences of a more destruc-
tive virus. Lawmakers have found it difficult to draw any clear lines.
The potential hazard of viruses to banks, governments, insurance
companies, hospitals and other institutions that rely on computers
emphasizes the need for comprehensive computer crime legislation at
both state and federal levels.
A. State Law
State legislators have begun to evaluate their own efforts
against computer crime. Forty-eight states have enacted specific
computer crime laws.31 (See Appendix). The acts forbidden and the
25. Marshall, The Scourge of Computer Viruses, SCIENCE, April 8, 1988, at 133.
26. Gemignani, supra note 17, at 64.
27. Id. at 65.
28. Barbagello, "Maybe Viruses Will Get The Legislature 'in the Mood'", TRIBUNE
REVIEW, Sept. 11, 1988.
29. Marshall, supra note 25, at 134.
30. Gemignani, supra note 17, at 66.
31. DeWitt, Invasion of the Data Snatchers, TIME, Sept. 26, 1988, at 67.
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penalties imposed for violations vary widely among the states. Mean-
while, the rapid advancement of computer and communications tech-
nologies makes the job of legislating against computer crime very
difficult.32
Most computer crime statutes were written before the risks of
computer viruses became known. None of these statutes mention vi-
ruses by name and few clearly address how viruses work.33 In addi-
tion, existing computer laws are adversely affected by three key fac-
tors: (1) prevailing legal attitudes toward computer crime; (2) easy
access to computer systems; and (3) inconsistent legal penalties for
violations of existing laws. For those who create illicit viruses, this
situation appears to provide the perfect loophole."'
1. Prevalent Legal Attitudes.-Traditionally, the prevalent le-
gal attitude toward computer crime has been one of ambivalence.
Police and prosecutors manifest this attitude by a reluctance to pur-
sue the computer criminal. The reasons for the lack of prosecution
include: (1) understanding the technology of the crime requires spe-
cial expertise; (2) preparation of a case against a suspect can be par-
ticularly time-consuming and tedious; (3) the "criminals" seem more
clever than dangerous; and (4) the victims are more likely to be
large businesses or banks than individuals.3 5
Courts have manifested their ambivalence by frequently dis-
missing computer crime indictments. In some cases, the dismissals
occurred because the "criminal" act is outside the statute under
which charges were brought. Even in cases where indictments were
not dismissed, the sentences imposed in successful prosecutions
hardly seem to justify the effort made to prepare the cases.3"
In addition, computer experts in many businesses are reluctant
to speak openly about viruses. This reluctance is motivated by the
fear of exposing the vulnerability of computer equipment. Industry
leaders do not want to talk publicly about their systems' security for
fear of being targeted by computer criminals.3 7 These fears, com-
bined with the ambivalent attitudes of the police, prosecutors and
32. Id. at 66.
33. Id. at 67.
34. Id. at 67.
35. Gemegnani, supra note 17, at 56.
36. Id. at 57. For example, one Indiana State Police sergeant spent hundreds of hours
compiling a case against a state employee who had gained unauthorized access to confidential
files. The employee eventually was convicted of theft of computer time. Gemegnani, Computer
Crime: The Law in '80, 13 IND. L. REV. 681, 713-15 (1980).
37. Keever, Electronic Invasion, The Harrisburg Patriot-News, Sept. 12, 1988, at I
(Business), col. 3.
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courts, have made the task of solving the problems associated with
computer viruses a challenge for lawmakers.3 8
2. Access to Computer Systems.-In a precedent-setting case,
a Texas jury recently convicted a programmer of infecting a com-
puter program with a destructive virus. 39 The defendant, Donald
Burleson, was found guilty of planting a computer virus in his for-
mer employer's system, wiping out 168,000 sales commission
records. Burleson had been an employee of the USPA and IRA
Company, an insurance and brokerage firm. The company found a
series of programs built into their computer system. Two days after
Burleson was fired, the programs activated and were not discovered
until two days later. If the programs had gone undetected, damage
to the computer system could have amounted to hundreds of
thousands of dollars. Burleson was convicted of harmful access to a
computer, a third degree felony.40
Texas enacted its computer crimes laws in 1985.:1 Likewise,
most states now have computer crime statutes in some form."2 Often
the success or failure of a prosecution may depend on whether the
statute defines "access" and, if access is defined, whether it covers
the alleged unlawful act. A computer trespass case tried under the
Washington statute is illustrative. In State of Washington v. Olson,43
the state Court of Appeals dismissed an action against an officer in
the University of Washington Police Department who was accused
of computer trespass in the first degree. The defendant in Olson had
obtained printout information on college students through the Uni-
versity's Communications Center. Although the defendant had not
retrieved the information as part of an investigation, he still argued
that his conduct did not amount to unauthorized access. The Code
under which the defendant was prosecuted provided:
(1) A person is guilty of computer trespass in the first de-
gree if the person, without authorization, intentionally gains ac-
cess to a computer system or electronic data base of another;
and (a) the access is made with the intent to commit another
crime; or (b) the violation involves a computer or data base
38. Id. at I (Business), col. 2.
39. Baltimore Sun, Sept. 21, 1988.
40. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.03 (Vernon 1989). The penalty for harmful access is
up to ten years in prison and a $5,000 fine.
41. 1985 TEX. GEN. LAWS ch. 600, § 1.
42. Soma, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY & THE LAW § 7.11, at 225 (1978).
43. 47 Wash. App. 514, 735 P.2d 1362 (1987).
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maintained by a government agency."
The state law defined "access" as to "approach, instruct, com-
municate with, store data in, retrieve data from, or otherwise make
use of any resources of a computer, directly or by electronic
means." 4  The court reasoned that the defendant's conduct
amounted only to unauthorized use of computer data; whereas, the
conduct prohibited by the statute was unauthorized access. The
court stated that because permission to access the computer was not
conditioned on the use of the data, there were no conditions attached
to the defendant's computer access. Therefore, even though depart-
mental policy prohibited certain use of data, it did not withdraw per-
mission to access the computer. Since the defendant had authoriza-
tion at the time the information was withdrawn, the Washington
statute, which prohibits only unauthorized access, did not cover the
action."
Olson emphasizes the necessity for state legislatures to define
both the terms of art used in the computer statute and those utilized
by the computer industry. Clear definitions are necessary to obtain
uniform judicial interpretation and application of statutes.' 7 Many
state statutes manifest legislative intent to include theft in their stat-
utes. In order to successfully prosecute those who create computer
viruses, however, the statutes must also cover interference with com-
puter programs and data in their definitions of computer crime.'8
California is recognized as one of the nation's leading states in
developing computer technology. This high-tech environment has
prompted the California legislature to pass one of the most compre-
hensive computer crime laws in the country.49 The California statute
expresses the intent to expand the protection of "individuals, busi-
nesses and governmental agencies from tampering, interference,
damage and unauthorized access to lawfully created computer data
and computer systems."50 Subsection B of the California statute con-
tains definitions of terms of art used in the computer industry. The
statute defines "access" as a "means to gain entry to, instruct, or
communicate with the logical, arithmetical, or memory function re-
44. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9a.52.110 (1988) (emphasis added).
45. Id. § 9a.52.010(6).
46. Olson, 47 Wash. App. at __, 735 P.2d at 1364-65.
47. Smith, Who Is Calling Your Computer Next? Hacker!, 8 CRIM. JUST. J. 89, 107
(1985).
48. Id. at 106.
49. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (West Supp. 1988).
50. Id.
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sources of a computer, computer system or computer network."5 1
This new law is still untried by the courts.
The California legislature recognized the need for specific defi-
nitions in its computer crime statute. These specific definitions are
necessary to combat increasingly complex computer crimes, like
computer viruses. States such as Washington,52 which have com-
puter crime statutes, but have failed to define the terms used, face
frustration because perpetrators of computer viruses may find a loop-
hole in their statutes.5 3 Legislatures must strive to be specific to
avoid forcing courts to define technical terms.
3. Penalties for Computer Crime.-Early attempts to prose-
cute forms of computer "vandalism" under state theft statutes were
not successful. In Lund v. Commonwealth of Virginia,54 the Su-
preme Court of Virginia struck down a grand larceny conviction
based on the unauthorized use of computer services. Under common
law, services and labor could not be the subject of theft, since neither
could be carried away. Lund, a graduate student, needed to use the
school's computer for his research. Lund's instructor failed to secure
for Lund an official access required for graduate students, and, Lund
admitted accessing the computer by using friends' pass keys. Even if
his conviction had been upheld, Lund would not have been required
to serve a prison term. Such results tend to discourage prosecutors
from pursuing those who are suspected of making unauthorized use
of a computer system. The Virginia legislature has since passed a
computer crime statute to avoid this type of result in the future.55
The problem faced by the Court in Lund is similar to the
problems that other courts encounter in computer virus cases. In
cases when, at first glance, the "interference" seems to do no more
than inconvenience legitimate users, the question arises whether per-
petrators should face criminal or civil penalties. Minnesota Senator
Darril Weigsheid introduced a bill in Minnesota to deal with at-
tempted access to critical computer systems." Weigsheid found sup-
port for his position by telling his colleagues about a program that
displayed a picture of a Christmas tree on computer users' terminals.
The seemingly innocuous program demonstrated the powerful nature
51. Id.
52. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9a.52.110 (1988).
53. See BENDER, COMPUTER LAW § 4B.15[2] (1983).
54. 217 Va. 688, 232 S.E.2d 745 (1977).
55. Gemignani, supra note 17, at 62.
56. Bloombecker, Cracking Down on Computer Crime, STATE LEGISLATURES, Aug.
1988, at 13.
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of viruses. This particular virus became a computerized chain letter
and its users did not know they were involved. The virus program
copied itself to the address of each users' electronic mail list and tied
up the system. Even though the virus was relatively harmless, it
caused operators to shut down the IBM electronic mail system until
it was removed. Because of the possibility that such viruses could
gain access to and disrupt air traffic control systems or medical in-
formation and health care systems, or shut down essential utilities,
one of the goals of Senator Weigsheid's bill was to "match the sever-
ity of the punishment to the level of harm from the crime.""7
This question also arises in distinguishing treatment of a "mali-
cious" as opposed to a "benign" virus, and whether these intrusions
should be penalized under criminal laws or civil remedies. 8 Often a
typical computer vandal may have little money with which to pay a
judgment. In such cases civil liability would not be a sufficient deter-
rent. Additionally, bringing a civil action can be expensive and time
consuming for the person affected by the virus. The victim may also
have difficulty obtaining the evidence necessary to gain a judgment. 9
While civil actions alone do not seem to answer the computer virus
problem, there are also concerns about criminal penalties.
Confusion surrounds how viruses should be addressed under the
criminal laws. Introducing any "foreign" code into another's com-
puter system can cause a problem, for even a benign virus can have
unintentional but devastating effects.60 State laws cannot ignore such
intrusions, even in cases where the original intent was nothing more
than teenage curiosity. Some current state laws could be construed
as covering these "damageless intrusions." Often, however, the sever-
ity of the penalties destroy any hope of successful prosecution. Few
prosecutors are anxious to bring felony charges against teenage
hackers with no prior offenses on their records." Nevertheless, states
must address deterrence in their statutes even though there is a ten-
dency to ignore behavior that does not cause harm. The behavior is a
violation of the law and must be sanctioned. 2
One option for the states whose laws do not adequately address
computer viruses is to follow the example of states like California6"
57. Id.
58. Gemignani, supra note 17, at 65.
59. Id.
60. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
61. Bloombecker, supra rote 56, at 13.
62. See Smith, supra note 47, at 95.
63. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(e) (West 1988).
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and Missouri.64 Though neither state statute mentions viruses specif-
ically in its statute, both address the problem of so-called damageless
intrusions. Whether or not there was a malicious intent, the result of
any intrusion is time consuming for data processing departments. In
addition to purging the system of the virus, time must also be spent
in attempting to protect systems from future invasions. Therefore,
both California and Missouri laws allow the victim of the computer
access to recover the cost of any expenditure incurred by the owner
to verify that a computer system was not damaged by the access."
California's Act also contains a provision addressing first offenses of
computer trespass. This provision also allows for a maximum fine of
$250, provided no injury occurred.6 Adoption of such a provision in
state legislation will encourage those that are victimized by a virus,
whether malicious or benign, to take action against the perpetrator.
This type of provision could apply to computer viruses if states define
"access" carefully in their statutes to cover instances when intrusions
alter, destroy or damage the computer system, its programs, or its
data and instances when damages are incurred as time and money
spent purging a virus from a system.
Even though most states provide for criminal penalties, the
states differ greatly in the classification of the computer crime as a
felony or misdemeanor and the penalty provisions. The New Jersey
statute is unique in that it provides only civil remedies for computer
related offenses.67 The California, Delaware, Connecticut, Illinois
and Virginia statutes have provisions for civil remedies as well as
criminal remedies.68 The civil remedies may include the right to
bring a damage suit or to seek an injunction as well as an enforce-
ment action.
Concern over the vulnerability of government computer systems
to computer viruses prompted the Legislative Budget and Finance
Committee of the Pennsylvania General Assembly to undertake a
comprehensive study of computer viruses and their impact.6 9 The
Committee analyzed how computer viruses relate to computer crime
and whether viruses would be addressed under Pennsylvania law. Ti-
64. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 569.099 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
65. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(e) (West 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 569.099 (Vernon Supp.
1989). See Bloombecker, supra note 56, at 13 (discussing above statutes).
66. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(d)(3)(A) (West 1988).
67. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:38-A-1 to 2A:38-A5 (West Supp. 1985).
68. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 931-939, 2738 (Supp. 1984);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53A-250, -261 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 15-1, 16D-I
to -9 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-152.1 to -152.14 (Supp. 1986).
69. REPORT TO THE PA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, supra note 11.
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tie 18, Section 3933 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes
makes it an offense to access, alter, or destroy a computer network,
computer program, computer system, software, data base or any
other computer part with the intent to disrupt the normal function-
ing of an organization.7" The statute also makes intentional unautho-
rized access an offense.71 It has two additional provisions that appear
unique to Pennsylvania. One provision makes it a crime to intention-
ally, knowingly, and without authorization give or publish a pass-
word, identification code, personal identification number, or other
confidential information about a computer.72 Another provision
makes one who is an accomplice in a computer crime subject to pros-
ecution under the statute. 3
The Committee reasoned that the introduction of a computer
virus, which has the ability to access, alter or destroy, appears to be
a computer crime falling within this statute. The committee also
noted that a computer virus case has never been brought to trial in
Pennsylvania. Even if the statute is interpreted as including com-
puter viruses, the committee concluded that the Pennsylvania statute
did not adequately address all areas of computer virus activity.
74
Among the specific weaknesses identified by the study were the stat-
ute's failure to specifically define the type of action which could be
considered an offense, and the failure to relate the penalty imposed
by the statute to the damage suffered.75
B. Federal Law
The development of federal computer law has been similar to
the development of computer law in the states. Congress recognized
the need for a comprehensive federal computer crime law. Congress
formed a committee to investigate the growing problems of computer
fraud and abuse. The committee found that the use of computers in
businesses and homes had grown significantly. 78 The committee also
determined that existing criminal laws were insufficient to address
the problem of computer crime.77 In response to the committee's
findings, Congress passed the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of
70. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3933 (Supp. 1988).
71. Id. § 3933(2).
72. Id. § 3933(3).
73. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 306 (1982).
74. REPORT TO THE PA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, supra note 11, at 14.
75. Id.





The federal statute is not intended to cover all potential com-
puter crime. The Senate investigating committee recognized that
some states lack comprehensive computer crime statutes. The com-
mittee noted, however, that the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act was
intended "to limit federal jurisdiction to those cases in which there is
a compelling federal interest."79 Included among these cases would
be those in which the crime itself is interstate, the computers in-
volved belong to the federal government, or certain financial institu-
tions are involved.
The nationwide virus attack of November 3, 1988, has demon-
strated that the creation and spread of a computer virus is not a
clear-cut federal offense under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.
In such cases the FBI, charged with enforcing the Act, must deter-
mine whether the virus attack involves a federal crime. To date,
there have not been any prosecutions under the Act for computer
viruses. Similar to other law enforcement agencies, investigations of
computer viruses are a new field for the FBI. Complicated proce-
dures and the technical nature of the virus program make it difficult
to pinpoint the actual perpetrator.
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act has six sections defining
proscribed behavior under the Act. Four of the six sections do not
seem to apply to most computer viruses. Section 1030(a)(1) prohib-
its obtaining information that has been protected by an Executive
Order or statute."0 Obtaining access to information contained in fi-
nancial records of financial institutions or consumer credit agencies
is unlawful under section 1030(a)(2). 81 Accessing a federal computer
knowingly and with the intent to defraud is proscribed by section
1030(a)(4). 81 Section 1030(a)(6) makes it unlawful to display pass-
words which would permit unauthorized access to others'
computers.83
The legislative history notes that two sections of the Act were
meant to deal with offenders who are completely outside the govern-
ment.84 Section 1030(a)(3) makes it an offense to intentionally gain
access to a government computer without authorization and to affect
78. Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Supp. V
1987).
79. S. REP. No. 99-432, supra note 76, at 2482.
80. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(I) (Supp. V 1987).
81. Id. § 1030(a)(2).
82. Id. § 1030(a)(4).
83. Id. § 1030(a)(6).
84. S. REP. No. 99-432, supra note 76, at 2486-87.
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the government's use of such a computer.8" In order to prosecute an
offender under this section there must be a showing that there was
an intent to cause the disruption, that the entry was unauthorized
and that the computers involved were either exclusively for the use
of the government or used by or for the government of the United
States.
Section 1030(a)(5) was designed to penalize those who inten-
tionally, without authorization, access a government computer and
alter, damage or destroy computer data belonging to another.8"
There are two circumstances in which alteration, damage or destruc-
tion will be penalized. One instance is when data relating to medical
care and treatment is altered, damaged and destroyed. The second
instance is when the total loss to the victim or victims is $1,000 or
more in any one-year period. The loss is to include actual repairs and
any other expenses the victim might sustain, "such as lost computer
time and the cost of reprogramming or restoring data to its original
condition."87
Both sections are aimed at punishing those lacking authoriza-
tion to access any federal computer. Moreover, both sections require
a showing of intent to cause the disruption. The difficulty in meeting
these statutory requirements for prosecution was evident in the No-
vember 1988 virus outbreak. There is no indication that the student
intended to alter, damage or destroy data, so it appears that the stu-
dent could not be prosecuted under the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act.
IV. Security and Prevention
The increasing number of outbreaks of computer viruses have
revealed that current computer crime statutes are largely inadequate
to deal with the virus problem. Coping with regular outbreaks of
computer crime has created difficulties for those charged with prose-
cuting and enforcing the laws. The lack of statutory law on specific
computer crimes causes many of these crimes to go unprosecuted. 8
In some cases those crimes that are prosecuted go unpunished be-
cause of the insufficiency of the old laws. 9 These problems are mag-
nified by the difficulties of investigating computer viruses because of
the technical nature of the crime. These viruses also point out the
85. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3).
86. Id. § 1030(a)(5).
87. S. REP. No. 99-432, supra note 76, at 2489.
88. Smith, supra note 47, at 11I.
89. Id.
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vulnerability of business and government computers to outside
attack.
Legislators must act to pass legislation that is specific to deal
with computer viruses before they are faced with a devastating at-
tack. While the virus introduced by the Cornell student was more of
a nuisance, it should serve as a warning that viruses can potentially
be extremely destructive. For this reason state and federal govern-
ments must be ready to respond. Legislation alone, however, is not
enough to deter one who would infect a computer system with a vi-
rus. Government and private industry must take steps to improve
computer security. Traditionally, computer security was considered
after the purchase of a new system.90 In light of the recent outbreak
of computer viruses, computer security consultants are advising those
with computer systems to make security a priority.91
The recent publicity surrounding computer viruses has triggered
a growth of computer vaccine programs.9 Some computer special-
ists, however, warn that the effectiveness of such vaccine programs
are limited; therefore, a vaccine program should be part of a more
comprehensive computer security plan.9 The best strategy for gov-
ernment and business to combat viruses and other computer crimes
is to develop a comprehensive plan regarding computer security and
practices before a problem actually arises. While no system can be
totally secure, implementing security measures can decrease the inci-
dence of crimes and save businesses, governments and consumers
from more damaging losses.94
Computer users should first examine their systems, paying spe-
cial attention to those parts of the system that operate outside con-
ventional data processing departments, such as personal computers
and research computers, to determine who has authorized access to
the systems and what programs are authorized for use.95 Then a plan
can be developed to either limit physical access to the main systems
or to implement access control software to screen any person at-
tempting to access the computer system.9 6 Another method to con-
trol computer use is to develop written procedures regarding the use
of the system.97
90. Boston Globe, Dec. 6, 1988, at 24, col. 5.
91. Id.
92. Wall St. J., Nov. 7, 1988, at B6, col. 1.
93. Washington Post, Nov. 8, 1988, at 7, col. 5.
94. Smith, supra note 47, at 110.
95. Wall St. J., Nov. 7, 1988, B6, col. 4.
96. Smith, supra note 47, at 110.
97. Id.
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To further protect against viruses, comprehensive computer se-
curity plans should contain a disaster recovery plan and a plan for
systematic backup of data.' 8 The costs of recovery from a computer
virus could be minimized if computer system users have a plan in
place to handle such problems. Following the November 1988 virus
attack, research facilities and universities that had disaster plans
avoided total shutdown of their computer systems."9 Steps for recov-
ery from a virus should be included in the disaster plan. A critical
feature in any recovery plan for a computer catastrophe caused by
virus is good backup files. Any computer user must plan systematic
backup of data in order to restore the system."'
V. Conclusion
The problem of computer viruses covers a broad spectrum of
behaviors, from benign nuisance type intrusions to the more mali-
cious destructive intrusions. Laws with clear civil and criminal pen-
alties are needed to address this broad spectrum of abusive behav-
iors. Legislation and security programs alone cannot be effective as
the only deterrence against would-be computer vandals. Education is
essential and must include not only the technical dimensions of the
problem, but also a focus on the issue of computer ethics. Addition-
ally, clear organizational policies and training regarding appropriate
usage are needed to develop a sense of responsibility and accounta-
bility among those who have access to powerful computer networks.
Camille Cardoni Marion
98. REPORT TO THE PA. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, supra note 11, at 21.
99. The Harrisburg Patriot News, Nov. 5, 1988, Al, col. 1.
100. REPORT TO PA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, supra note 11, at 21.
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APPENDIX
Here is a compilation of state laws governing computer viruses.
ALA. CODE §§ 13A-8-100 to -103 (Supp. 1986).
ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.46.200(a)(3), .740, .985, .990(1), (3)-(7)
(Supp. 1986).
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2301E, 13-2316 (1978 & Supp. 1986).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (West 1988).
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-5.5-101, -102 (1986).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53A-250, -261 (1985).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 931-939, 2738 (Supp. 1984).
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 815.02 to .07 (West Supp. 1986).
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9-90 to -95 (1984).
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 708-890 to -896 (Supp. 1984).
IDAHO CODE §§ 18-2201 to -2202 (Supp. 1986).
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 15-1, 16D-1 to -9 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1988).
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-43-1-4, -2-3 (Burns Supp. 1986).
IOWA CODE ANN. § 716A (West Supp. 1986).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3755 (Supp. 1985).
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 434.840 to 434.860 (1985).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:73.1 to 14:73.5 (West 1986).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 71-a § 357 (1985).
MD. CODE ANN. § 146 (Supp. 1986).
MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 266, § 30 (1983).
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28-529 (1987).
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.87 to 609.89 (West Supp. 1986).
MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-45-1 to 97-45-13 (Supp. 1985).
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 569.093 to 569.099 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45.2-101, 45-6-310 to 45-6-311 (1985).
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-1343 to 28-1348 (Supp. 1985).
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 205.473 to 205.477 (1986).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 638:16 to 638:19 (Supp. 1985).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:38-A-1 to 2A:38-A-5 (West Supp. 1985).
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-16A-1 to 30-16A-4 (1984).
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 156 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-453 to 14-457 (1981).
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-06.1-01(3), 12.1-06.1-08 (1985).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2901.01(J)(1), (2), 2913.01(E),(F), (L)-
(Q), 2913.04 (Baldwin 1987).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1951-1956 (West Supp. 1985).
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 164.125, 164.345-164.365 (1985).
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PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 3933 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-52-1 to 11-52-5 (1981 & Supp. 1986).
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-16-10 to 16-16-40 (Law. Co-op. 1984).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 43-43B-1 to 43-43B-8 (1983 & Supp.
1984).
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3-1401 to 39-3-1046 (Supp. 1986).
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 33.01 to 33.05 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6702 et seq. (1979).
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-152.1 to 18.2-152.14 (Supp. 1986).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.48, 100, 52.110 to 52.130, 56.010
(West 1977 & Supp. 1986).
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.70 (West Supp. 1986).
WYO. STAT. §§ 6-3-501 to 6-3-505 (1983 & Supp. 1986).
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